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It is a standard understanding that we live in time. In fact, the whole physical world as de-
scribed in sciences is based on the idea of objective (not absolute) time. For centuries we have
defined time ever so minutely, basing them on finer and finer event measurements (uncoiling
springs to atomic clocks) that we do not even notice that we have made an inductive leap when
it comes to time - we can measure time, so we experience time. In the current work I wish to
critique this inductive leap and examine what it means to experience time. We are embodied
and embedded cognitive agents, constrained by our body as well as in continuous interaction
with our environment. So another way to ask the question of temporal experience would be
- how embodied is time? I posit that experience of time spoken of in general literature is a
linguistic construct, in that, the idea of experience of time overshadows the actual phenomenal
contents of time perception. Moreover, time perception itself comes from a post-facto judg-
ment of events. It has also been observed that the order of events in time can be altered to
create an illusion of violation of causality itself. This points to the possibility that events are
arranged in a temporal map that can be read off by higher cognitive substrates. In the current
work we go on to explore the nature of such a map as it emerges from an embodied mind.
Introduction
We live in time – it holds us and moulds us – but
I’ve never felt I understood it very well. And I’m
not referring to theories about how it bends and
doubles back, or may exist elsewhere in parallel
versions. No, I mean ordinary, everyday time,
which clocks and watches assure us passes reg-
ularly: tick-tock, click-clock. Is there anything
more plausible than a second hand? And yet it
takes only the smallest pleasure or pain to teach
us time’s malleability. Some emotions speed it
up, others slow it down; occasionally, it seems
to go missing – until the eventual point when it
really does go missing, never to return.
The Sense of an Ending, Julian Barnes
Our experience is malleable. We retain traces of emotions
generated from a beautiful melody even long after the ac-
tual music stops. Sometimes, we experience the same event
alongside another in the form of a déjà vu. We are also in a
constant state of growth and maturation, with malleable be-
liefs and imports, so that we have a sense of a unified ego
(cogito encased in flesh) that moves through time1. In all
standard theories of cognition, time is taken as an a priori
category of consciousness. It is even hard to imagine how
one can talk about the conscious experience and cognition in
general if one did not have an ontological commitment to the
idea of a subjective experience of time not only as embodied
(our cognition is constrained, regulated and dependent in the
body) and embedded/situated beings, but also as biological
entities (our development, growth, and maturity form a linear
progression).
However, such an ontological commitment to an a priori
category of time leads to some very acute problems, both
philosophically as well as theoretically. In the following sec-
tion, I would try to show the difficulties with the ontological
commitment to the subjective experience of time. However,
merely questioning subjective experience of time leaves us
without a sound account of temporal phenomena in cogni-
tion. The challenge lies in giving an account of temporal ex-
istence on the basis of some other a priori category without
giving in to the trap of Cartesian ontology.
In Section Three, I re-examine conceptual frameworks
within the embodied stance of cognition to locate spatial rep-
resentations as a possible solution. Although spatial repre-
sentation has been shown to serve as an explanation of tem-
poral phenomena in cognition, we must also locate the pos-
sibility of relative autonomy of spatial representation from a
linguistic one, as a completely linguistic representation leads
inevitably to Cartesian ontology.
However, spatial representation only forms one part of the
story. It still leaves the question of the substrate of such a
representation. In Section Four, I posit ontological priority
of events and show how a possibility of a phenomenological
account of event might operate. If events coupled with spa-
tial representations replace the idea of subjective experience
of time, it leads to a very interesting consequence for the em-
1Even though the present ego might not identify with the beliefs
and import of the ego-construct
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bodied stance and intentionality defined therein. In the last
section, I discuss the future directions that follow from this
new ontological commitment.
Anatomy of time
In this section we are concerned with the time that is sub-
jective - the time we are nostalgic about, the time that we are
afraid of losing, the time we spend, the idea of time on the
basis of which we plan for future, organize our day, the time
through which we claim we move through and mature, and so
on - as opposed to objective time. In the current work we take
a realist position on objective time, but anti-realist position
on subjective time. Subjective time is mostly in the domain
of language. We talk about our subjective time through the
categories of language and thus the subjective time is subject
to linguistic relativism (Nùñez, 2008). We also make a dis-
tinction between subjective time and subjective experience
of time2.
In the perceptual domain time enters as instant of time (oc-
currence of an event) and duration (gap between two events
in question), i.e., as a relation between events. Subjective
experience of time thus refers to the experience of the rela-
tion itself. Subjective time on the other hand is a construct of
language that helps us build a narrative around events in our
memory. In the following we will try to show the relation of
events can appear as a map (similar to the maps that are com-
mon in discussions on visuo-spatial attention). We will now
explore two examples within the literature of time perception
to explore the two aspects of instant of time and duration of
time.
Motor-sensory recalibration. There have been several
demonstrations of temporal asynchrony in the visual do-
main (Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997b, 1997a). More recently,
Stetson, Cui, Montague, and Eagleman (2006) have shown
that by adapting to a fixed delay between a keypress by a
human participant followed by a sensation, they could intro-
duce illusory reversals by negating the delay after adapta-
tion. This interesting case of reversal points us to a direction
where instants of time-events are not integrated immediately,
but rather an illusion-specific activation in anterior cingu-
late/medial frontal cortex point to a malleable representation
of time events being compared to a more rigid representa-
tions (Stetson et al., 2006).
Johnston and Nishida (2001) have shown that attempts to
explain the perceptual anomaly with neural processing de-
lays raises very important philosophical issues. They have
shown that, if we assume what they refer to it as ‘brain time’
hypothesis (equating perceptual time to processing time), we
will run into two kinds of problems. In the explicit form, the
relative time of events get encoded in higher level ‘metaneu-
rons’. However, it appears that it simply substitutes higher
level processes for the events themselves. In the implicit
form of brain time hypothesis, then Johnston and Nishida
(2001) explains, “If our perception of the time of an event is
coded implicitly, as the time at which a perceptual state of
the brain is established - tantamount to the time at which we
become aware of the contents of the event - then the medium
of temporal sensory experience is no longer physical, as it
is for the other five senses, it is conscious experience itself”.
Rather we should try to find answers within common spatio-
temporal processing of percepts themselves.
Temporal oddball. Events have a subjective duration. It
remains an open question whether duration is perceived di-
rectly, like a visual feature, or f it depends mainly on a com-
parison process. Numerous studies have shown that sub-
jective time experience depends on low-level visual proper-
ties and also the attentional focus. In the oddball paradigm,
Tse, Intriligator, Rivest, and Cavanagh (2004) reported that
duration judgments for stimuli longer than 120 ms showed
temporal expansion. In another work we used a computa-
tional model to determine whether a decision-based account
of temporal judgments could account for temporal expan-
sion. We used a single layer recurrent dynamic on-center
off-surround network of fully connected nodes with self-
excitation and lateral inhibition (based on Usher and Cohen
(1999)) optimized for winner-take-all dynamics for duration
judgments (Sengupta, Surampudi, & Melcher, 2014). The
‘winner’ node, out of the two that receive the inputs of differ-
ent duration values, determines the duration judgment. One
node received the habituated input (standard) and the other
received novel input (oddball). We ran a simulation over a
range of durations (from 30 ms to 1200 ms) in order to calcu-
late the subjective expansion factor for these durations if they
were used as standard duration for oddball trials. The simula-
tion results closely match the pattern of experimental results
collected by Tse et al. (2004), including the 120 ms cutoff for
TSE. These findings suggest that the TSE effect might arise
out of comparison process rather than perceived difference in
time itself (Sengupta, Bapiraju, Basu, & Melcher, 2014).
It seems extremely plausible from above discussion that
temporal processing of events follows a map of events with
spatial representation3. Given the above, there are two ways
that subjective experience of time is possible. Firstly, the
map’s representation is completely dependent upon linguistic
representation and thus cannot be separated from the content
of experience. Secondly, the relation of events as given by
map is itself a content of experience. In the following we will
2We are not dealing with the question of biological time - in
terms of circadian rhythms, heart beats, pulses, and so on. Organ-
isms have a way of biological time keeping, in that, there is a pe-
riodicity that the organism can rely on for its survival. However,
here we are more interested in the time that is taken as content of
subjective experience.
3For instance the illusory reversal of events could also be ac-
counted for within a temporal map following spatial on-center off-
surround representation.
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try to show that on both counts subjective experience of time
is impossible. In the next section I challenge the first point by
locating a possibility of non-linguistic representation within
the embodied paradigm.
Autonomy of space
In essence embodiment stance in cognitive science as-
serts a fairly simple but deep departure from the stan-
dard approaches that are commonly labeled as Cognitivism
(i.e., both functionalism and connectionism along with other
derivatives of physical symbol systems stance) - human
cognition is located within a dynamic goal-directed action-
oriented process involving both the body and the environ-
ment (M. Wilson, 2002). Even if specialized cognitive func-
tions are served by different parts of the brain, the involve-
ment of body and environment amounts to much more than
input-output circuitry. We ascribe meaning to our world
based on the constraints posed by the body (R. A. Wilson
& Clark, 2009) and our roles as being-in-the-world is regu-
lated by the body (Dreyfus, 1990). The embodied stance is
far from uniform. Early proponents like Lakoff and John-
son (2003) propose a view where a metaphorical process de-
riving from the body and its structure is central to human
cognition. Dreyfus (1990) derives a Heideggerian account
from his consideration of AI and robotics, to propose an
anti-representational process using the world as its model
(Dreyfus, 2007). Freeman (1995) proposes an intentional
arc (following Merleau-Ponty (2002)) through which an or-
ganism has its cognitive dispositions (determined by corre-
sponding attractor states) altered through its action in the en-
vironment. These three major viewpoints have their advan-
tages and also some inherent distinctions. In the next few
paragraphs I would like to point out conceptual distinctions
between these positions and will attempt to arrive at the nec-
essary conceptual apparatus needed to address the question
of the temporal experience of human cognition.
Lakoff and Johnson (2003)’s account in some form does
adhere to at least a moderate stance of the Sapir-Whorf hy-
pothesis (Sapir, 1983; Whorf, 1956) for linguistic relativism
(seen more explicitly in their later work, (Lakoff & Nun`ez,
2000)). Metaphoric process within the unconscious can im-
pinge upon the meaning formation because the linguistic cat-
egories determine our world view. To extend their argument,
one has to assume at least a linguistic representation of the
world, but one that is grounded in the body rather than being
arbitrary like in the case of physical symbol systems hypoth-
esis (PSSH, see Newell and Simon (1976)). Figure 1 eluci-
dates the major import of their position on embodiment.
Dreyfus (1990) has rejected Cartesian ideas inherent in
traditional AI and Cognitive science (i.e., the position that
context-free, disembodied, representations governed by rule-
like algorithms separated from and independent of the cog-
nitive being and the world inhabited by it, are sufficient for
Figure 1. Embodied stance of Lakoff and Johnson (2003).
building AI or understanding cognitive psychology). From
his analysis of Frame problem in AI (writing a closed set of
axioms for all given and novel situations), Dreyfus (2007)
points out that the fundamental difficulty of a Cartesian on-
tology where one does not just see something, but sees it as
something - there is always an extra step of deciding how to
apply meaning to a given situation. On the other hand in the
Heideggerian approach meaning is always ready-at-hand,
To say a hammer has the function of being for
hammering leaves out the defining relation of
hammers to nails and other equipment, to the
point of building things, and to our skills all of
which Heidegger called readiness-to-hand and
so attributing functions to brute facts couldn’t
capture the meaningful organization of the ev-
eryday world. -Dreyfus (2007)
In his account, embodiment exists in “being-in-the-world”
relation between cognitive agent and the world, what Dreyfus
(2007) describes as ‘background coping’. He uses Gibson
(1987)’s idea of affordances to explain how the world affords
the actions available for the cognitive agent in a continuous
and non-representational manner. In fact, he criticizes the
idea of Cartesian self-enclosed entity itself, rather thinking
of experience as a flow during ‘everyday coping’ Dreyfus
(2000).
Although Freeman (1995)’s account is very similar to
that of Dreyfus (2007), there are some key differences.
His account derives from the works of Aquinas (1990) and
Merleau-Ponty (2002). The key concepts here are unity (by
the mind’s assertion of a boundary against the outside) and an
intentional relation (between intellect and material objects)
which shapes itself by changing its scales to accommodate
the object through the process of knowing it. Intentionality
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as defined here is not “about-ness” (Searle, 1992). Mean-
ing is achieved through action in the world, and the self is
altered by that action. Although Aquinas (1990) describes
intentionality as directing action towards some future de-
fined and chosen by the actor, intentionality is fundamen-
tally an unconscious process, i.e., the self is not necessar-
ily a conscious agent. Merleau-Ponty (2002)’s formulation
of “the intentional arc” that completes an organic loop from
action through the world and back into the brain, resembles
Aquinas’ active intellect. The intentional arc names the tight
connection between the agent and the world, perception and
action. The skills acquired by the agent are not stored as rep-
resentations but as dispositions to respond to directing situa-
tions in the world. Thus for Freeman (1995), the term inten-
tionality means the “process of a brain in action having the
properties of unity, wholeness, and intent.” Unity refers to a
state of integration by which a self distinguishes itself from
non-self. Wholeness refers to a bounded process by which
through stages a self actualizes its mature form, ultimately to
die. Intent refers to a relation in which a self modifies itself
in conformance with aspects of non-self. A living brain thus
capable of actualizing these properties by purposive behavior
is an intentional structure.
From the above discussion it emerges that we can distin-
guish the three afore-mentioned strands within the embodied
cognition literature along three dimensions: representation,
idea of self, and basis of cognition. The differences are sum-
marized in Table 1.
The above table makes it explicit that there are some ma-
jor irreconcilable differences within the three strands of em-
bodiment. Lakoff and Johnson’s idea of linguistic represen-
tation is incompatible with the others, but their idea of an
unconscious process as a basis of cognition is fairly in line
with Freeman’s account. However, it is unclear how much
the metaphoric process can be reconciled with the intentional
arc in the perceptual domain. On the other hand, Dreyfus’s
idea of “being-in-the-world” relation is not compatible with
Freeman’s notion of self that distinguishes itself from non-
self through unity.
In both Dreyfus and Freeman’s account representation is
disposed off almost completely. However, we know that
there is some validity to the idea of representation from re-
searches in retinotopic and topographic maps in the brain. It
is not confined just to the visual domain either (Chen, Zhou,
Chen, He, & Zhou, 2013). The main problem is that thinking
of representation in a linguistic manner guarantees a Carte-
sian ontology. However, any idea of a representation that is
completely non-linguistic is doomed to fall flat in the case
of human cognition. As shown by Dreyfus (1990), on-line
cognition can be traced to a state of flow (being-in-the-world)
that does not require any mediating representation. However,
we do employ quite a lot of off-line cognition that do defi-
nitely rely on representation. These representations may be
derived from the body as some views of embodiment litera-
ture hold (M. Wilson, 2002). Even so, it does not discount the
possibility of a representational matrix (as seen in saliency
map literature by Melcher and Piazza (2011); Roggeman,
Fias, and Verguts (2010) or in literature on topographic maps,
like Seelke et al. (2012)) which is essentially a spatial one.
The idea of a spatial saliency map representation underly-
ing perception and action is not limited to just vision, but
involves auditory (Kayser, Petkov, Lippert, & Logothetis,
2005) and tactile (Diederich, Colonius, Bockhorst, & Tabel-
ing, 2003) modalities as well. These saliency maps are
part of pre-attentive visual stream and may not be cogni-
tively penetrable (Pylyshyn, 1999). A subsequent decod-
ing of a saliency map requires linguistic features of cogni-
tion. Moreover, Bonato, Zorzi, and Umiltà (2012) have re-
cently summarized an array of literature that points to var-
ious similarities between spatial and temporal processing
and suggest that space, time, and number processing might
be grounded in neuronal structures for spatial attention and
sensori-motor processing. Spatial numerical abilities in other
animals (Dehaene & Changeux, 1993) suggests that spatial
processing might operate at least partly in an independent
manner from linguistic ability. Given the above we can make
a case for spatial representations that are grounded in sensori-
motor process, i.e., embodied, and also can maintain relative
autonomy from linguistic representations.
Ontology of the event
Phenomenology, either in the line of Heidegger or
Merleau-Ponty, forms the theoretical kernel for much of the
philosophy of mind in the embodied tradition. Thus, it comes
as no surprise that the idea of a discreet mental event seems
contrary to the embodied stance. The phenomenological idea
is to explore how reality appears to consciousness. Con-
sciousness is continuous. Then where will be the scope of
something as discreet as an onset of an event, and what is
the meaning of the order of events given in time? As Dastur
(2000) explains
As Maurice Merleau-Ponty shows in his Phe-
nomenology of Perception ..., philosophy can
give neither a realist nor an idealist solution to
the problem of time. It does not succeed in locat-
ing it either in things themselves or in conscious-
ness. If, on the one hand, we consider time to
be no more than a dimension of reality, we can
no longer explain the relationship between what
comes first and what follows. The succession of
events can only be established by consciousness,
a consciousness which requires, in order to have
a general view of the succession of events, not
to be completely immersed in time. But what if,
on the other hand, we consider time to be a mere
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The relation between different strands of embodied stance
construction of consciousness? Temporality it-
self becomes incomprehensible, insofar as it is
the essence of time to be incompletely present
to consciousness, to remain incompletely consti-
tuted, as Husserl would say. For time, precisely,
is not identical to being, it is a process which is
always in becoming. It is always of the order of
the process, the passage, and that which comes.
Therefore realism (which immerses the subject
in time to the point of destroying all possibility
of a time-consciousness) and idealism (which
places consciousness in a position of overview-
ing a time which no longer proceeds), are both
unable to clarify what they pretend to explain,
that is, the relation of consciousness to time. For
in both cases, what remains out of range for a
philosophical inquiry which wants to see in time
either a reality or an idea is precisely its tran-
sitional character, its non-being or non-essence,
which is not, but proceeds.
Dastur (2000)
The problem of temporality rather appears in giving time a
priori ontological basis in consciousness. Rather, we should
try to understand the phenomenal character of the event and
proceed from there. We propose here an ontological priority
of the event - in that it is not that event is something that
breaks the continuous flow of consciousness through time as
a surprise4, rather we should understand how a limited con-
sciousness would construct the flow of events post-priori due
to its inability to cope with them all at once. Attending to
many events is expensive for the organism in terms of en-
ergy. To deal with multitude of events we need coherence,
repression of events, we need order - we construct time. This
is inexorably linked to how the organism forms an idea of
self.
In autism, subjects display “pattern of impairment in cog-
nitive tasks that demand contextual processing, coupled with
... superiority at tasks that demand piecemeal processing of
individual features” (Belmonte, 2008). Thus for the autistic,
the surrounding is ‘threateningly intractable’. Thus they ex-
hibit repetitive behavior akin to what Belmonte (2008) calls
re-viewing the ‘Cartesian cinema’, to come to terms with
their selves and surrounding. However, one can also look
at this as multiple events as constituting a single instant of
integrated time for the self.
The other side of the spectrum appears to be Schizophre-
nia where a de-coherence of internal integration leads to
hallucinations and delusions and a host of other symptoms.
Schizophrenia presents an unique problem for embodiment
- how can the same embodied being embedded in a single
environment have different minds so to say. To put it better,
we can ask how an embodied being can fail to integrate its
own temporal existence. The failure of integration would not
arise if time is more fundamental to embodied existence than
an event is. Rather we propose here that events are prior to an
embodied being. The flow of consciousness itself might arise
due to a finite organism’s strategy to keep track of multiple
events.
A serious objection to the above position can be raised
from the perspective of Dreyfus - how does the primacy of
4“The event constitutes the “dehiscence” of time, its coming out
of itself in different directions, which Heidegger calls “ekstasis,” the
fact that it never coincides with itself, and which Levinas names di-
achrony ... For the event, as such, is upsetting. It does not integrate
itself as a specific moment in the flow of time. It changes drastically
the whole style of an existence ... It does not happen in a world–it is,
on the contrary, as if a new world opens up through its happening.
The event constitutes the critical moment of temporality–a critical
moment which nevertheless allows the continuity of time.”-Dastur
(2000)
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events allow us to explain on-line cognitive activity like ham-
mering the nail example. The question hinges upon the as-
sumption that, on-line cognition by virtue of its unconscious
fluidity negates the ontological priority of events that enter
consciousness. However, there is no reason to think so. The
unconscious dynamical processes are driving forces of cog-
nition, but conscious experience may get its structure from
events. Both are not mutually incompatible.
Magnitude of intentionality
As an alternative to this understanding of voli-
tion, I want to describe a neural basis for goal-
directed actions that is common to both humans
and other animals, because it reflects the evo-
lution of human mechanisms from simpler ani-
mals, in which intent can operate without will.
The concept - “intentionality” - was first de-
scribed by Thomas Aquinas in 1272 to denote
the process by which humans and other animals
act in accordance with their own growth and
maturation. An intent is the directing of an ac-
tion toward some future goal that is defined and
chosen by the actor. It differs from a motive,
which is the reason and explanation of the ac-
tion, and from a desire, which is the awareness
and experience stemming from the intent. A
man shoots another with the intent to kill, which
is separate from why he does it and with what
feeling.
Freeman (2000)
In light of the above discussion it is important to address
some very important issues. Our biological growth and ma-
turity is linear, so is the goal-directed intentional arc. In other
words the intentional arc that doubles back to the individual,
is forward seeking. If we have an event-based spatial ontol-
ogy to replace time, we still leave out another possibility. We
experience linearity in time because things happen linearly.
So, in spite of all my previous arguments, a forward seeking,
goal-directed intentional arc can still experience time relation
because the world affords linearity in cognition.
I have a series of interconnected arguments against the
possibility.
1. As far as linearity in thinking goes, the idea of linearity
itself is subservient to the recognition of simultaneity
and order (event A and event B occurred together, but
prior to event C, and so on), which themselves possibly
have spatial representation and thus are subject to the
limits of capacity.
2. The limits of capacity appear only in the case of con-
scious recognition of this simultaneity and order (i.e.,
operating on them with working memory). However,
it does not preclude the very large storage of patterns
in long term memory.
3. With regard to ideas of biological linear progression,
I think evolution is as parallel as it is linear (one can
even say probably more parallel than linear). Evolu-
tion operates in jumps and parallel mutations that ac-
cumulate for an environment, which itself undergoes
drastic change to halt the progression and lead through
another parallel branch (consider the reptilian to mam-
malian evolution).
4. Regarding the idea of change from life to death and
of physical time itself, we know that Newtonian and
Quantum physics are both time-symmetric (i.e., they
do not distinguish between t and -t). Only when we
come to macroscopic results (in the realm of statisti-
cal physics and thermodynamics) do we get time as
the direction of increase of entropy in a closed sys-
tem. However, there are some recent works that lean
towards the possibility that a recorder/measurement it-
self is involved in giving the arrow of time.
Keeping in mind the above, there is a need to probably let go
of the idea of non-reducible intentionality. We must reduce
intentionality at least at a theoretical level if not at the entity
level. We need to operationalize intentionality in terms of
other a priori ontological categories in order to get the full
blooded idea of intentionality promised by Freeman.
The future of embodiment stance will lie in the way we
use the tools available to us to get a much better idea of hu-
man cognition. For instance, categorical off-line thinking has
been a challenge to embodiment paradigm. However cate-
gorical thinking or conceptual thought depends upon the idea
of sets, sets depend upon the notion of numbers. We have
made progress in establishing numbers on the foundation of
spatial representation (Grossberg & Repin, 2003; Sengupta,
Surampudi, & Melcher, 2014). The other steps are sure to
follow to give us a full fledged “dynamical systems” ontol-
ogy of mind.
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